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Abstract 
 
Many applications are transferred from C/S (Client/Server) mode to P2P (Peer-to-Peer) mode such as 
VoIP (Voice over IP). This paper presents a new security architecture, i.e. a trustworthy authentication 
algorithm of peers, for Session Initialize Protocol (SIP) based P2P computer networks. A mechanism 
for node authentication using a cryptographic primitive called one-way accumulator is proposed to 
secure the P2P SIP computer networks. It leverages the distributed nature of P2P to allow for 
distributed resource discovery and rendezvous in a SIP network, thus eliminating (or at least reducing) 
the need for centralized servers. The distributed node authentication algorithm is established for the 
P2P SIP computer networks. The corresponding protocol has been implemented in our P2P SIP 
experiment platform successfully. The performance study has verified the proposed distributed node 
authentication algorithm for SIP based P2P computer networks. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) is one of the important topics in the research of next generation networks. P2P 
brings significant changes to the Internet. P2P applications have gained increasing popularity over 
recent years, particularly for those using Session Initialisation Protocol (SIP). It is regarded as the 
core control protocol for the next generation network, and is evolving from its original C/S 
(Client/Server) mode to P2P mode (Rosenberg & Schulzrinne & Camarillo & Johnston & Peterson & 
Sparks & Handley & Schooler, 2002). 
 
SIP was initially published in 2001 for establishing, changing and terminating sessions in IP networks. 
Recently, SIP has widened its applications and been used in multimedia conferencing, long-distance 
white board and instance message. SIP was used to simplify the connection of IPSec VPN and to 
combine conventional multimedia services with other services, such as directory information, web 
browsing, searching and tracking. As an application layer protocol, SIP is independent upon the 
actual network. Hence any types of participants in IP networks can be connected using SIP. For 
instance, SIP can provide a seamless connection between PSTN and GSM. This functionality would 
become more and more important with the deployment of 3G mobile networks across the world. 
 
With the expansion of SIP based applications, the C/S mode appears to have drawbacks that are 
hard to overcome. To address these problems, the SIPPING working group of IETF has conducted a 
series of research on P2P distributed mode for SIP computer networks. Since 2005 the group has 
proposed several protocols; the latest two are “An Architecture for Peer-to-Peer Session Initiation 
Protocol” (IETF SIPPING, 2005) and “A P2P Approach to SIP Registration and Resource Location” 
(IETF SIPPING, 2005). 
 
The latest two protocols proposed by the SIPPING group have two different P2P SIP architectures. 
The first protocol suggests a distributed SIP server to be deployed, i.e. the information about 
participants is distributed to every server in P2P mode. These servers communicate with each other 
using Distributed Hash Table (DHT) algorithms and all participants share and query resources in the 
same mode. The second draft takes advantage of a P2P structure, leading to the elimination of the 
SIP server with all the SIP nodes being associated in some way. The differences between the two 
P2P SIP architectures are that the former still retains some characteristics of C/S mode, but has a 
manageable advantage. The latter is a pure P2P structure as each node in the structure maintains its 
neighbour’s information and the scalability and management of the structure needs to be explored 
further. Although both protocols suggested their own P2P SIP architectures and application 
algorithms, the security problems of the architectures are still remained unsolved.  
 
The security of SIP based computer networks becomes a serious problem after transferring from C/S 
mode to P2P distributed mode (Singh & Schulzrinne, 2004). The centralized control method might 
solve most of security problems with the C/S network. However, there are more security issues to be 
considered in the P2P distributed environment, not only existing security threats to the centralized C/S 
network, but also encountering new ones in the P2P networks where nodes join and leave 
dynamically. Due to the lack of a centralized management, the P2P networks need extra safety 
approaches to ensure itself to run smoothly (Milojicic & et al, 2002). 
 
The security of the P2P SIP network involves many aspects. They are routing security, saving and 
accessing security, malicious destroy, intentional deception, user and peer authentication, encryption 
and decryption, application security and personal privacy. The major security problem of the P2P SIP 
network is peer trustworthy authentication when nodes join the network. 
 
This work focuses on peer trustworthy authentication (namely node authentication). A peer 
authentication solution based on a one-way accumulator is suggested in this paper for P2P SIP 
computer networks. The authentication method is adapted to P2P mode, and can be used to ensure 
the authenticity of the identity of the SIP node that is added to the P2P SIP network, preventing forged 
ones from being added to the network. A cryptographic primitive called one-way accumulator is also 
presented. The corresponding node authentication algorithms are established based on the 
accumulator and a node authentication protocol according to the specific characteristics of the P2P 
SIP application. Finally, the performance of the proposed node authentication protocol is verified in 
our P2P SIP experiment platform. 
 
 
Authentication for P2P SIP Computer Networks 
 
Due to the essential differences between P2P mode and C/S mode, the authentication technologies 
suited to C/S mode cannot be directly applied to P2P computer networks (Nowell & Balakrishnan & 
Karger, 2002). Hence new authentication methods capable of adapting to the P2P networks are 
sought. 
 
There is no explicit difference between peer authentication and user authentication for SIP networks 
in C/S mode. Both adopt the HTTPS DEGEST authentication method (Rosenberg & et al, 2002). In 
contrast, for SIP networks in P2P mode user authentication is different from node authentication. User 
authentication performs at the application layer, verifying the participating user’s identity in a special 
SIP application and ultimately confirming whether the user has right to access the resource. Node 
authentication is used to ensure the reliability and security of nodes and to testify the authenticity and 
validity of the participants. In terms of the objects being encrypted, the two authentication methods 
have some similarity. For example, both run in the same way that one part (or multiple parts) validates 
the identity of the other part (or other multiple parts). As existing methods can be directly adopted to 
solve the security problems associated with the user authentication for P2P SIP networks, this study 
is mainly focused on node authentication for the networks. 
 
One approach to node authentication is the legal node identification technology using the global list of 
the legal nodes in P2P SIP networks. When a node needs to validate the identity of its peer, the 
identification list of legal nodes can be queried (Nowell & Balakrishnan & Karger, 2002; Lennox & 
Schulzrinne, 2003; Xiong & Liu, 2004). The shortcomings of this centralized authentication method 
include complex management, un-scalability, and single node’s failure. 
 
Node authentication based on the encryption technology has more virtues than the legal node 
identification technology mentioned above (Xiong & Liu, 2004). The digital signature using encryption 
is the major method of implementing node authentication. The basic idea is to validate the node’s 
identity through its digital certificate issued by the authorized organization. This can be achieved on 
the Internet. The node participating safe communication applies a digital certificate from the 
authorized organization, e.g. Certificate Authority (CA), which is responsible for issuing digital 
certificates. The credibility of the node can then be ensured by the authorized organization. In the 
communication process, the node provides its own certificate when its identity needs to be validated 
making its peer to know its identity. 
 
The node authentication using digital certificates has derived from the centralized CA technology. It is 
convenient to inosculate with the existing information security technology. It can be used for small- or 
medium-scale P2P networks. However it is not appropriate for large-scale P2P computer networks 
(Camenish & Lysyanskaya, 2002). On the one hand, there should not be a central controlling node in 
the P2P networks. On the other hand, the centralized CA does not conform to the distributing 
character of the P2P networks. 
 
The distributed CA technology, attempting to divide the function of the traditional centralized CA into 
several distributed nodes, was proposed to solve the single node’s failure problem with the traditional 
CA technology (Lennox & Schulzrinne, 2003; Xiong & Liu, 2004). With the technology all nodes 
collaborate on issuing the user’s certificate with their own shares of the CA private key. The users 
applying for certificates receive only the fragments of the digital certificates issued by these nodes, 
and the whole certificates can then be obtained through computing (the computing is performed by 
the node itself or with the help of the third party). The distributed CA technology not only needs the 
correlative infrastructure of key management (e.g. key distributing and key deleting) but also involves 
the management of certificates such as certificate withdrawing, certificate renewing etc. 
 
A new node authentication method is proposed based on a one-way accumulator for P2P SIP 
networks, leveraging the distributed nature of P2P to allow for distributed resource discovery and 
rendezvous in a SIP network, and eliminating (or at least reducing) the need for centralized servers. 
 
 
Proposed Node Authentication Based on a One-way Accumulator 
 
The main objective of this study is to propose a new mechanism for node authentication using a 
cryptographic primitive called one-way accumulator.  This section is to detail how to construct the one-
way accumulator and the basic ideas of the node authentication. 
  
Basic Principle 
 
According to the correlative theory of cryptology, the one-way Hash function that meets the half-
exchange law has the following characteristics (Bnaloh & Dde Mare, 1994): 
o The one-way characteristic of the Hash function signifies that it is easy to compute in a certain 
way but it is very difficult to compute in other ways. 
o Half-exchange law means, on condition seeds being given, the result of the accumulator keeps 
invariable when it is computed in different orders. 
 
On the basis of the two characteristics, a one-way accumulator is suggested in this study to validate 
whether an appointed value belongs to the corresponding set of nodes, and a special authentication 
scheme is designed to meet the requirements of node authentication for P2P SIP computer networks. 
The basic principle is summarized below. 
 
Firstly, each node in P2P SIP networks is assigned a number i and a uniquely correlated private key yi. 
All nodes should submit their own values of (i, yi) to an appointed authentication node, i.e. a bootstrap 
node in the P2P SIP networks. 
 
Secondly, having received all nodes’ values of (i, yi), the appointed node, i.e. the bootstrap node, 
takes use of the one-way accumulator to calculate the total accumulative value z for all the nodes and 
the corresponding partial accumulative values of (i, zi) for each node. The appointed node then sends 
the partial accumulative values to the corresponding nodes, and distributes / publishes the total 
accumulative value z to all the nodes in the networks. 
 
Thirdly, the node j is used to validate the identity of its peer, e.g. the node i that intends to establish a 
connection with it. After the peer node i submitting its own value of (yi, zi) to the node j, the node j then 
calculates the Hash value z’ = h(yi, zi) and determines whether z’ equals the total accumulative value 
z. If z’ is equal to z, the node i passes validation; otherwise, the node i fails authentication. 
 
The characteristics of the one-way accumulator determine the security and credibility of node 
authentication, so constructing the one-way accumulator is the core step in the design of the 
authentication protocol. The one-way accumulator should not only ensure the simplicity of validation 
computing, but also guarantee there is no contradiction between the final results. 
 
The unique identity of the node in P2P SIP networks described by the value (i, yi) is the warrant of the 
node’s routing communication. So the most important aspect of the node authentication algorithm is 
to ensure the uniqueness of the legal node’s identity. This can be achieved by using the private key 
distribution method, which is discussed in details in another paper. 
 
The anti-forgery of authentication information requires that nodes in P2P SIP networks cannot forge 
other nodes’ authentication information, and cannot destroy the uniqueness of the nodes. It could 
prevent nodes from spoofing credentials or repaying attacks. Thus a Challenge-Response mechanism 
based on a random number will be introduced in the proposed node authentication algorithm to 
prevent forging (Maricn & Piftzmann, 1997). 
 
One-way Accumulator Based Node Authentication Algorithm  
 
Constructing a one-way accumulator is the major task of designing the node authentication algorithm 
for P2P SIP networks. Equation (1) is proposed as a one-way accumulator based on an exponent. It 
has been proved to be the one-way function that has the characteristics of accumulators (Michael & 
Goodrich & Tamaassia & Hasic, 2002; Mukherjee, 2006). ( )niYynxznxz iyyyy i ,...2,1,,modmod .... 21 =∈=→=    (1) 
where n is an integer. 
 
To establish the node authentication algorithm based on equation (1), the following procedures are 
performed: 
 
Step 1: a random integer generator RANDOM() generates an integer m; 
 
Step 2: the function PRIME(m) capable of selecting a prime number is used to choose a big enough 
prime number n from the set of [1 ,…, m] as follows: 
)1(*)1()(,* −−== qpnandqpn ϕ       (2) 
where ϕ(n)  is the Euler number, p and q are prime numbers, and p != q. 
 
Step 3: the accumulative value z is calculated by using equation (3). 
( ) nxniYynxz yi Yyiyyy mod,...2,1,,mod.... 21 ∏==∈= ∈     (3) 
 
Step 4: the partial accumulative value of the node j is calculated by using equation (4). In fact, each 
node can compute its partial accumulative value zj after receiving the accumulative value z. ( )
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Step 5: equation (5) is used for node authentication. If p equals 1, the node j is legal and passes 
authentication; otherwise, node authentication fails. ( )0:1?mod nzzp jyj===        (5) 
To reduce the expense of calculating the accumulative value z, equation (6) is then suggested to 
compute the accumulative value z when a new node j is added to the P2P SIP network. 
nzz jyj mod=          (6) 
 
P2P SIP computer networks are dynamical and self-organized networks in which nodes can join and 
leave randomly. When a node is added or deleted, the boot node must update the corresponding 
information about all the nodes in the networks, such as re-calculating the accumulative value z and 
the partial accumulative values zi for each node. So the node authentication protocol based on the 
one-way accumulator suggested above should include four stages, protocol initiation, node adding, 
node deleting and node authentication. The details are discussed in the next section. 
 
 
Design of a Node Authentication Protocol for P2P SIP Computer Networks 
 
Based on the one-way accumulator constructed by the method presented above, a node 
authentication protocol is then suggested in this section for P2P SIP computer networks. 
 
Architecture of P2P SIP Computer Networks 
  
According to a draft, “A P2P Approach to SIP Registration and Resource Location” suggested by 
SIPPING (IETF SIPPING, 2005), a hierarchical P2P SIP architecture is proposed here, as shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1: The architecture of a P2P SIP network 
 
In this architecture, the whole P2P SIP network is divided into many groups. Within a group, a super 
node (SN), e.g. node 2 in Figure 1, is used to store the routing information of other ordinary nodes 
(ONs), and the ordinary nodes query their neighbours through the SN. This is the first layer of the 
hierarchical architecture. The second layer consists of all the SN groups in the network. Between 
groups, a super node routes a message to another SN using P2P algorithms called Distributed Hash 
Tables (DHTs) that support efficient search mechanisms when resource names are precisely known. 
The proposed hierarchical architecture for P2P SIP computer networks has a number of advantages, 
including: 
o It would reduce significantly the average number of hops in a lookup, particularly when nodes are 
heterogeneous. 
o It would cut down the lookup latency when the peers in the same group are topologically close 
and cooperative caching is used within the group. 
o It facilitates the large-scale deployment of the P2P lookup. 
 
The key feature of the P2P SIP architecture (Fig. 1) compared with SIP in C/S mode is that it has no 
dedicated server or proxy (IETF SIPPING, 2005). The nodes participating in the overlay not only act 
as traditional SIP User Agents (UA), allowing their users to place and receive calls, but also play the 
roles of registrars and proxies in SIP networks when being viewed collectively with other peers. These 
roles include resource location, maintaining information, and call routing. 
 
 
Fig. 2: Extension to the node REGISTER messaging 
 
The semantics of standard SIP messaging is preserved to a great extent as possible in order to 
implement the node authentication protocol on P2P SIP networks. All the messages that maintain 
DHTs and are required to query information are implemented using SIP messaging. The SIP 
REGISTER messaging is extended here to look up resources. It includes maintaining DHTs, such as 
the messages that are joined or left the overlay network, and information transferred between nodes. 
So the extended REGISTER messaging has two functions, one is to accomplish node registration and 
validate newly joined nodes (see Figure 2 for the REGISTER message format in this situation); 
another function is to implement the resource registration before the session is invited, and the 
REGISTER messaging has no contact information, but resource IDs. 
 
A new header parameter, Key, is introduced in the node REGISTER messaging as shown in Figure 2. 
It is used to inform the peer about its authentication number yi (private) and the partial accumulative 
value zi with both parameters being encrypted. 
 
 
Fig. 3: The signalling process of a P2P SIP network 
 
Consequently, the REGISTER messaging has various functions at different states for P2P SIP 
networks, and the whole signalling process of the P2P SIP networks is shown in Figure 3. The first 
REGISTER message is used to accomplish node registration; similarly, the second and the third are 
also used for node registration. But the seventh and ninth REGISTER messages are used to perform 
user registration. Having completed user registration, a node sends an INVITE message, e.g. the 15th 
message, to initiate a session with its peer. Among these messages, the node registration message, 
REGISTER, has the information of node authentication. 
 
 
Assign a modulus n
Compute two big primes  q & p, n = p*q
Calculates z , z = x0y1 mod n
Compute the Euler number  ϕ(n) = (p-1)(q-1)
Assign a seed x0, gcd(x0, ϕ(n)) = 1
Assign a node IDy1, y1Є z (private)
 
 
Fig. 4: The process of the initialization stage 
 
 
Details of the Node Authentication Protocol 
 
The node authentication protocol based on the proposed one-way accumulator in the preceding 
section can be divided into four stages, initialization stage, node adding stage, node deleting stage 
and node authentication stage. 
 
Initialization stage 
 
The initiation process of the protocol is shown in Figure 4. At this stage, some parameters such as 
ϕ(n), p, q and y1 are introduced, in order to accomplish the parameter initialization of the 
authentication protocol. 
 
Node adding stage 
 
Figure 5 shows the process of the node adding stage. Provided that there are not many nodes in the 
P2 SIP computer network, for example, the total node number is less than 100, all nodes in the 
network are regards as one group. The bootstrap node in the network is responsible for calculating 
the total accumulative value z. Other nodes in the P2P SIP network then calculate their own partial 
accumulative values (zi) after receiving the accumulative value broadcasted by the bootstrap node. 
 
Assign a big number yi as a node own ID
Added node sends yi to SN by REGISTER
SN calculates z by using (6) and broadcasts z
Ordinary nodes calculate their own zj by using (4)  
 
Fig. 5: The process of the node adding stage 
 
Whereas, if there are more than 100 nodes in the P2P SIP network, the nodes in the network are 
divided into groups in order to improve the efficiency of node authentication. As a result, a super node 
(SN) is chosen for each group. The firstly added node of a group is acted as a temporary SN; with 
more nodes added to the group, the super node of the group is then selected according to the SN 
selection algorithm (Liu & Huang & Li, 2008). The computation of the accumulative value is 
accomplished by the super node, and ordinary nodes in the group calculate their own partial 
accumulative values after receiving the accumulative value broadcasted by the SN. 
 
Node deleting stage 
 
Having been added into the P2P SIP network, a new node should send periodically a REGISTER 
message to the bootstrap node or the super node. Note that the interval between two REGISTER 
messages can be adjusted in terms of the node number in a P2P network. Meanwhile, if the node 
number in the P2P network is too large, then the nodes in the network should be divided into multi-
groups in order to decrease the load on the super node. This issue is discussed in detail in the 
following section. Otherwise, the bootstrap node or the SN will delete the ID of the new node from the 
node list, and update the z and zj values by using equations (3) and (4). The bootstrap node or the SN 
is responsible for computing the new accumulative value and broadcasting it to ordinary nodes, which 
compute their own partial accumulative values once a node has been removed. 
 
Node authentication stage 
 
The process of node authentication is shown in Figure 6. If a node intends to establish a connection 
with its peer according to the best peer selection algorithm, it must pass the authentication by its peer 
first. Only if the authentication is successful, the node can then establish a connection with its peer by 
using the node REGISTER messaging as shown in Figure 2. Otherwise, the link cannot be 
established.  
 
If the nodes in the P2P SIP network are divided into groups, the super nodes of the groups are 
required to perform node authentication using the authentication protocol. As long as a node passed 
node authentication, it may be regarded as a trustworthy super node by other ordinary nodes within 
the group. 
 
Node authenticated shows its (yi, zi) by REGISTER
Node authenticated computes z’ by using (3)
Authentication success
User registration
z = z’ ? Authenticationfailure
N
Y
 
 
Fig. 6: The process of the node authentication stage 
 
 
Evaluation of the Proposed Node Authentication Protocol 
  
As the bootstrap node or the super node computes the accumulative value for all the nodes in P2P 
SIP networks, the performance of the node authentication protocol is dependent upon two factors. 
One is the hardware configuration of the bootstrap or the super node. The other is the complexity of 
the authentication protocol. It also depends largely on the complexity of the one-way accumulator on 
which the authentication protocol is based. 
  
Table 1 lists the performance results for the complexity of the node authentication protocol described 
in the preceding section. In Table 1, the complexity of communication denotes the time of exchanging 
message. For example, O(2) means it needs to exchange two messages for a node to be validated. 
The complexity of computation indicates the time of an exponent operation, e.g. O(1) denoting two 
executions of the exponent operation. 
 
Table 1:  Complexity of the node authentication protocol 
 
Complexity Operation 
Communication SN Computing ON Computing 
Node added O(m) O(1) O(1|) 
Node deleted O(m) O(1) O(1) 
Node validated O(2) O(0) O(1|) 
 
 
The proposed node authentication protocol is simulated in our experiment platform with a piece of 
streaming media playing software being implemented on a P2P SIP network (Figure 7) (Liu & Huang 
& Li, 2008). The software, deployed on the CERNET2 network, is used to play on-demand TV and 
streaming media. The nodes in the P2P SIP network are divided into groups. Each group consists of 
the nodes that play the same streaming media program. A node must pass authentication before it 
can join the appointed group. 
 
 
Fig. 7: A streaming media playing software on a P2P SIP network 
 
To assess the performance of the node authentication protocol, some groups are organized in a way 
that they had different numbers of nodes ranging from 10 to 100 nodes. These nodes are configured 
with Intel duo core CPU, 1GB memory and windows XP. All applications support IPv6. 
 
The delay times of adding a node, deleting a node and validating a node are measured respectively 
on our experiment platform, and the experimental results for the delay times are shown in Figure 8. 
The delay time of adding a node is the time spent by the bootstrap node to compute the accumulative 
value when a node joins the P2P SIP network. Similarity, the delay time of deleting a node is the time 
required by the bootstrap node for computing the accumulative value in the case of node deletion. 
The delay time of validating a node is the time taken by a node to validate the identity of its peer.  All 
the three types of delay times include the communication delay, which is the time necessary for 
receiving and sending messages. 
 
The results in Table 1 and Figure 8 show that the authentication algorithm is a validating symmetry, 
which means the computing and communication overhead of each node in the SIP P2P network are 
almost equal. Symmetry requires that node authentication is totally distributed and no node should 
bear more responsibility than others. The symmetry characteristic meets the distribution requirement 
of P2P networks. The delay times of validating a node demonstrate the authentication algorithm has 
an excellent symmetry. The delay times of adding a node and deleting a node have some slight 
varieties when the node number increases, which is due to the increasing overhead of communication 
while the overhead of computation is steady. 
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Fig. 8: The delay time of the authentication algorithm 
 
The findings also reveal that the authentication algorithm has a high stability. As a dynamical and self-
organized network, the P2P SIP network allows nodes to join or leave the network freely. So the node 
authentication algorithm needs to ensure the stability of the authentication overhead when the node 
number of the network varies frequently. The authentication overhead includes both the 
communication delay and the computing delay. As shown in Figure 8, the delay times of validating a 
node are almost constant despite the node number changes. In addition, the delay times of adding a 
node and deleting a node increase slightly when the node number increases from 10 to 100. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
By analysing the differences between P2P (Peer-to-Peer) computing mode and traditional C/S 
(Client/Server) mode for SIP computer networks, the significance of node authentication in P2P over 
SIP computer networks has been emphasized by this study.  
 
A mechanism for node authentication using a cryptographic primitive called one-way accumulator is 
proposed and presented in this paper to solve the node authentication for P2P SIP computer 
networks. 
 
The performance study carried out on our P2P SIP experimental platform has proved that the 
proposed node authentication algorithm based on a one-way accumulator has been implemented on 
a P2P SIP network successfully. The test results indicate the proposed protocol has a high reliability 
and safety. 
 
The further work of research is to design a better one-way accumulator, simplifying the procedures of 
node authentication for P2P SIP computer networks. 
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